This research project analyzes the challenges of negotiating an international treaty on arms trade based on a recent literature that focus on the design of international regimes, the efficacy of these regimes and the decision-making mechanisms to approve international instruments. Concerning the design of international regimes, the work of Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) constitutes a supporting theoretical platform. Regarding the efficacy of the international regimes, I assume that during negotiations countries will attempt to incorporate institutional mechanisms that increase the likelihood of legal obligations compliance. In this sense, Gilligan (2004, 2006) and Downs and Jones (2002) offer a key contribution to understand the reasons and interests that lead countries to abide (or not) by the committed legal obligations within the international sphere. As to the decision-making process, this research project verifies to what extent the mechanisms of approval of treaties and committee elections proposed by Brams, Kilgour, e Sanver (2004, 2007) could contribute to the main object of this study: an international treaty on arms trade. In a first stage, hypotheses related to the positions taken by countries regarding the feasibility, scope and standards of an international treaty for arms trade are tested based on data made available by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.