

# **Determinants of patronage and policy-making positions in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy, 2007-2011<sup>1</sup>**

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## Abstract

Research on the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative in Brazil has generated a voluminous literature that sheds important light on our understanding of the policy-making process in Brazil and the relationship between the Executive and the political parties in Congress. However, little is known about how the bureaucracy is used as a tool for political patronage and its overall role in the policy-making. We aim to advance the understanding of this phenomena by studying which factors explain the distribution of political appointee positions in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy among political parties. By using an unique panel dataset and applying an One-Way Random Effects GLS regression model we found that the number of seats a party has in the lower Chamber, the party's appointment of a cabinet minister, and being from the same party as the president's (formateur party) play a fundamental role at explaining why some parties are more able to fill political appointees' positions with their party members in the bureaucracy than others. These findings lend credence to the idea that appointments in the Brazilian bureaucracy can be better understood as "coalition goods" (by establishing an exchange baseline between the partisent's party and the parties in the coalition) instead of "exchange goods" (as tools that help cover the ongoing costs of holding together the coalition).

Presidentialist and parliamentary democracies are commonly based on coalition politics (Cheibub et al 2004). The occurrence of one-party governments is somewhat rare in both parliamentary and presidentialist systems. In order to attract partners for the coalition, it is well established in the literature that the formateur party can offer a plethora of spoils, both policy-oriented and patronage-oriented, even if it is the president or prime minister's party which will account for a large and/or disproportional share of these spoils.

Though we know much about how ministerial portfolios are distributed in both parliamentary (Browne and Franklin 1973; Laver and Schofield 1990; many others) and presidential (Amorim Neto 1994; Martinez-Gallardo 2010; many others) democracies, there is still a lot to be learned about the determinants of the allocation of both patronage and policy-making positions in the bureaucracy.

We explore one main question related to this phenomenon: Why are some political parties able to appoint more members to bureaucratic offices than others? In order to answer it, we utilize an original dataset of over twenty thousand members of the bureaucracy that occupy political appointment slots in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy in 2010-2011.

In order to begin answering this question and advancing our knowledge on the role that bureaucracy plays at the policy-making decisions in Brazil we organize the present study as follows. First we revise the literature on the role and interaction between politics and bureaucracy and how and to what extent second-tier positions in the bureaucracy can be used by the Executive for patronage, control, and/or coalition formation. Then we present some hypotheses regarding the way some factors may explain the allocation of such second-tier positions among the Brazilian political parties. In order to empirically study the effect of such factors in the chances that political parties have to appoint their members to these positions we use an unique panel dataset and propose a Random Effects model. Finally, we present the findings and briefly discuss them.

## Studying politics and bureaucracy in Brazil

The Brazilian federal bureaucracy is comprised of 537,095 active employees, as well as about the same number of retirees<sup>2</sup>. As of December 2010, 21,681 (4%) of these employees were potential partisan appointees<sup>3</sup>. They occupy the so-called “DAS” (an acronym of *Direção e Assessoramento Superior*, or High Level Execution and Advisory) offices, first implemented during the military dictatorship in 1970 and kept alive in the 1988 Constitution. High-level DAS appointees are responsible, along with the minister, for the most important decisions taken in each ministry. One can divide the DAS appointees in two groups: DAS-1 to 3 and DAS-4 to 6. There are 17,114 (79%) DAS-1 to 3 appointees, and 4,567 (21%) DAS-4 to 6 appointees.

The first group is made up of low-level positions, with little policy formulation competence. They are paid from R\$ 2,115 to 4,042 (US\$ 1,200 - 2,200). Higher-level DAS appointees – that is, DAS-4 to 6 – are paid from R\$ 6,843 to 11,179 (US\$ 3,880 – 6,351) and control, influence and implement policies according to directives put forth by the minister and/or political parties. If the appointee is a career bureaucrat, he can opt to receive the full salary given to the position he gained by merit plus up to 60% of the DAS wage, a comfortable choice which some analysts consider excessively generous (De Bonis and Pacheco 2010, p. 359-360).

Since July 2005, DAS appointees are formally appointed by the minister of the *Planejamento* (D’Araújo 2009, p. 20), benefiting from informal consultation with the minister

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<sup>2</sup> This and the following paragraphs are largely taken from Praça et al (2011).

<sup>3</sup> An important methodological caveat is in order. The dataset on party membership does not offer identification of the party member besides his/her full name, and the same is true for the dataset on political appointment occupants. We excluded all homonyms within datasets, as well as homonyms within parties (for example, a “Sérgio Praça” member of the PMDB in the state of Pará and a “Sérgio Praça” member of the PMDB in the state of São Paulo) and across parties (for example, a “Bruno Hoepers” member of the PP in the state of Rio de Janeiro and a “Bruno Hoepers” member of the PMDB in the state of Minas Gerais). Our analysis below thus potentially underestimates the number of political appointees, but not the proportion between parties nor the distribution within ministries. See Appendix I of Praça et al (2011) for a discussion on this matter.

of the *Casa Civil*<sup>4</sup>. The *Casa Civil* is the most important bureau within the Brazilian presidency, also responsible for gathering legislative propositions from the other ministries and turning some of them into government bills and decrees (Queiroz 2009, p. 94-96).

Also in 2005, a decree established that 75% of the lower-level DAS appointees and half of the DAS-4 appointees had to be occupied by civil service career bureaucrats<sup>5</sup>. This is an indication that the diagnostic once held by some analysts – such as “[In Brazil], unusually extensive powers of political appointment complement lack of meritocratic recruitment” (Evans 1995, p. 61) – nowadays need to be taken with a large pinch of salt. Nevertheless, DAS appointments are widely recognized as occupied according to political patronage criteria.

It is easy to understand, then, why pundits and politicians alike ascribe great importance to the distribution of political appointment spoils. They are seen as compensation for politicians who lost elections or otherwise “sacrificed” themselves for the sake of the party (see Jardim 2011a; Jardim 2011b); as spoils to which the biggest parties are entitled a larger share (see Folha de S. Paulo 2010); as corruption-prone offices taken advantage of by shady figures such as party boss Valdemar Costa Neto (see Folha de S. Paulo 2011a); and as important offices occupied mostly by the formateur party (see Scolese and Leite 2007 and Bragon and Iglesias 2011). In sum, they are not to be ignored by any analyst of the Brazilian political system.

Much work has already been done regarding the first tier of Executive payoffs in presidentialist systems, such as execution of congressional budget amendments (Alston and Mueller 2005; Figueiredo and Limongi 2005) and portfolio allocation (Amorim Neto 1994, 2006; Martinez-Gallardo 2010) for coalition members, but the puzzle regarding payoffs in the

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<sup>4</sup> We thank Fernando Abrucio for bringing this to our attention.

<sup>5</sup> The proposal probably only passed in July 2005 due to the unveiling of the “Mensalão” corruption scandal the month before. Santos (2009, p. 14) points out that a few ministerial units enacted even stricter rules for the appointment of DAS offices.

second tier of the bureaucracy still remains. A previous study of ours has shown that partisan political appointees vary greatly among ministries and within them. In some ministries, political appointment offices are occupied by as much as 25% of partisan appointees, while in others this score is lower than 5% (Praça et al 2011).

A few words about the literature on bureaucracy and politics are in order<sup>6</sup>. Terry Moe (1985) was one of the first scholars to develop a rationale for presidential efforts to politicize the bureaucracy. Presidents would be driven by the formidable expectations that citizens, politicians, and the media have about their office. In order to measure up to them, they would “seek control over the structures and processes of government” (Moe 1985, p. 239). Presidents would not be solely interested in efficiency or effectiveness, nor in “neutral competence”. Instead, they would be mainly concerned with the dynamics of political leadership, with political support and opposition etc. Presidents would seek an institutional system responsive to their needs as political leaders. “Responsive competence” would be preferred over “neutral competence”.

Since Moe’s work, politicization started to be seen as an instrument for political control of the bureaucracy, but not only that. It is also viewed as a means for distributing patronage. Brown (1982) attempted to determine patterns of party affiliation among top-level presidential appointees from 1961 to 1980. There was evidence that extensive use of scarce presidential appointments to reward party stalwarts or to bolster party organizations was no longer viewed as a profitable exercise by the White House.

David Lewis (2007, 2008) contests the notions that presidential politicization of the executive branch is intended only to enhance political control of the bureaucracy and is successful at doing so, although he agrees with Brown’s thesis that the use of political appointments as a way of rewarding party members loyal to the president was in decline. He

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<sup>6</sup> The following paragraphs are also largely taken from Praça et al (2011).

argues that politicization choices are driven by patronage concerns, and politicization of the bureaucracy can ultimately make it harder for presidents to control the bureaucracy.

The literature reviewed so far is highly centered in U.S. presidential studies. This is because authors who study bureaucracy and partisan politics in Brazil have all too often ignored crucial aspects of this relationship that have been taken into account by analysts of the American presidency. Patronage has been ubiquitously considered as the single motivation behind partisan political appointments in Brazil, either because of cultural and historical reasons (Faoro 2000) or as a rational response to an uncertain environment (Schneider 1994). Patronage would entail bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of political representation, since political parties would be formally excluded from policymaking (Campello de Souza 1983, p. 32-33; Diniz 1997, p. 19; Nunes 1997). It was the worst of both worlds.

Alongside the supposedly patronage-ridden strategy – never backed up by the literature with more than a few case studies and/or anecdotal evidence –, “pockets of efficiency” were created within the bureaucracy by denying posts in certain ministries to partisan appointees and thus ensure better management and results (Evans 1995, p. 61-65; Geddes 1994; Gouvêa 1996), sacrificing political representation (Diniz 1997, Nunes 1997). We call this the “insulated bureaucracy” theory.

The political importance of DAS positions have been periodically documented by the media. It is known that the fulfillment of such positions has been carefully managed by president’s men of confidence such as José Dirceu during president Lula’s first term and Eduardo Jorge Caldas Pereira during president Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s term (see *O Estado de S. Paulo* 2005). We also know that the spending with such positions have increased considerably during Lula’s term (see Jungblut 2007; and Alvarez 2009). Reports also show that in seven years the number of DAS level 3 offices moved up from 580 to 948

posts (63,4% increase), DAS level 4 offices from 652 to 960 (47,2% increase) and DAS level 5 and 6 posts went up from 240 to 331 and from 60 to 89, respectively (O Globo 2009, p.3). Thus we have information showing that such political positions in the bureaucracy are important politically. However, sistematic studies on the role of such positions in the Brazilian political system are still lacking.

### **Main arguments and hypotheses**

We attempt to find out what are the determinants of partisan political appointments in the bureaucracy of a presidential system, taking Brazil as a case study. Our main hypotheses deal with the parties' seat share (H1); the parties' support of government bills on the floor (H2); the parties' ideological position (H3); the parties' occupation of ministries (H4) and if the party is the same as the president's (H5). We expect all of these independent variables to be positively associated with the occupation of political appointments.

The rationale behind these hypotheses is based on Raile et al's (2011) theory of coalition and exchange goods in presidential systems. Coalition goods are allocated at T1, when the coalition forms, while exchange goods are distributed during T2, T3 etc to "cover the ongoing costs of operation".

Coalition goods are typically ministerial positions, and exchange goods are typically pork barrel projects. The latter are commonly associated with parliamentary systems, in which there is usually an allocation of cabinet posts between enough political parties to form a majority coalition in parliament. This guarantees enough votes for the investiture of the prime minister, usually a deputy from the party with the most seats (Bergman et al 2006, p. 148-152). Exchange goods are most commonly associated with presidential democracies. A typical example is the United States, in which pork barrel projects (benefiting specific districts) are smuggled into general interest legislation in order to attract the votes of certain



deputies and thus form a very short-lived, policy-specific, coalition (Evans 2004, p. 2). Brazil is a particularly interesting case study to assess the determinants of how both types of goods are allocated (Raile et al 2011), since cabinet positions are deemed a neither necessary nor sufficient condition for parties to support government bills on the floor (Freitas 2008).

Party seat share (i.e. number of seats each party has to the total number of seats in the lower chamber) has been commonly regarded, in studies of coalition-building in presidential and parliamentary systems, as one of the determinants of cabinet distribution (Amorim Neto 1994; Cheibub et al 2004). It has never been tested, to our knowledge, to assess the distribution of lower-level political appointments in the bureaucracy<sup>7</sup>, and this is what we do in Hypothesis 1.

Party discipline is also commonly associated to the distribution of offices in both types of systems of government, due to the fact that spoils may be allocated to parties who exhibit higher discipline in the support of government bills. This is our second hypothesis and it is not yet perfectly tested due to the lack of a larger time series.

Party ideological position in the policy space is also very commonly associated with the distribution of offices (Martin and Stevenson 2001; Cheibub et al 2004; Amorim Neto 2006; Bräuninger and Debus 2009; Acosta 2009). It has not been tested yet for lower-level offices in the bureaucracy, so this is what we do in Hypothesis 3.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 are straightforward. We expect parties that hold ministerial positions to have better luck in appointing their members to lower levels of the bureaucracy, simply due to the fact that, once a party has a member as a minister, it is mainly a matter of administrative procedure to appoint members to that ministry<sup>8</sup> (H4). We also expect that the president's party – the Worker's Party, in this case – also appoints more members to

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<sup>7</sup> Although journalists like Rocha (2011) think it is an important part of the explanation of how offices are distributed in Brazil.

<sup>8</sup> It is important to note that since July 2005, political appointees in Brazil are formally nominated by the minister of *Planejamento* (D'Araújo 2009: 20), benefiting from informal consultation with the minister of the *Casa Civil*.

bureaucratic positions than others, due to the formateur bonus pointed out in the literature (Baron and Ferejohn 1987; Ansolabehere et al 2005).

## **Data and method**

For the purpose of assessing the factors that explain the allocation of DAS appointee positions among political parties we organized an original panel dataset that displays how many DAS appointees affiliated to 12 political parties<sup>9</sup> (which are the groups or entities in the panel) are in each one of the 76 ministerial agencies included in the dataset. The panel contains 1824 observations comprising two time periods (april of 2010, last year of president Lula's second term, and april of 2011, president Dilma's first year of her first term).

The criteria for a ministerial agency to be included in the dataset was the presence of at least one DAS civil servant (whether or not affiliated to a political party) in an agency's employees list. There may be concerns about the possibility of selection bias in the data due to the non-random feature of sample selection. However, selection bias would only occur if case selection (i.e. government agencies with DAS appointees) were correlated with the outcome of interest. Since we are interested in assessing the differential allocations by party we believe selection bias is not a problem.

The dependent variable of interest in this study is the ratio of the number of DAS appointees per political party in each one of the 75 ministerial agencies. The independent or explanatory variables are composed by characteristics of each governmental agency (included as control variables in our statistical model) and 5 political variables of interest, which are: ideology (party points estimates per political party<sup>10</sup>), party seat share of each political party in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the president's party (a dichotomous

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<sup>9</sup> The political parties in our dataset are: PT, PMDB, PCdoB, PDT, PP, PR, PRB, PSB, PSB, PTB, PSDB, DEM, and PPS. The last three parties were in opposition to Lula's government and are in opposition against Dilma Rousseff's government.

<sup>10</sup> Party points estimates for the PRB, a very recent political party, could not be estimated.

variable assuming value 1 if the party is the same of the incumbent president; zero otherwise), whether the minister to which an agency is subordinated belongs to one of the political parties (dichotomous variable), and partisan support for the Executive's bills in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. All variables included in the statistical model to be presented follows on Table 1.

**[Table 1 about here]**

The present study evaluates the impact of the explanatory variables of interest on the allocation of DAS appointees per political party through a multivariate statistical procedure more suitable to panel data analysis. The methods most commonly used are the Fixed Effects and Random Effects models (hereafter FEM and REM). Based on the nature of our dataset and also on theoretical reasons we apply the Random Effects Model with a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator.

The REM specifies the individual effects as a random drawn that is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and the disturbance term and it can be formally represented as:

$$Y_{it} = \mu + \beta X_{it} + (u_i + \varepsilon_{it})$$

Where  $\mu$  represents the mean of the "random" intercepts  $\alpha_i = (u_i + \varepsilon_{it})$  and  $(u_i + \varepsilon_{it})$  is the composite error term. We assume that both  $\mu$  and  $\varepsilon$  are "uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, uncorrelated to each other, and uncorrelated over individuals or time" (Baum 2006, p. 227-228). Overall REM estimators are unbiased (as well as OLS and FEM), but are more efficient than OLS and FEM (Kennedy 2008).

A FEM analysis would assume that the entities for which we are measuring are fixed, and that the differences between them are therefore not relevant. Nevertheless we want to understand what explains variation in the allocation of DAS appointee positions among political parties. Hence REM seems more appropriate because it accounts for the variance between the entities being measured (not only for parties but also for agencies).

In order to make sure that the use of a REM is more convenient than FEM we ran two statistical tests, the Hausman test and the Breusch-Pagan test. Based on the Hausman test's null hypothesis that the FEM and the REM estimators do not differ substantially we found that the null was not rejected (Prob > Chi2 = 0.5732). We also ran the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test to test the hypothesis that there are no random effects. We rejected the null hypothesis (for a Chi2(15) = 177.91, Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000). Thus the Breusch-Pagan test reinforces the Hausman test, which also found that the REM is appropriate to the present analysis (Gujarati 2009).

## **Results and Discussion**

The One-Way Random Effects GLS regression results are shown on Table 2. There are two variables that report missing values in the dataset (institutionalization and ideology). Therefore in order to correct for problems that missing values can bring to a statistical analysis we corrected that by imputing the mean value of both variables.

The dependent variable, the ratio of DAS appointees affiliated to political parties to the total number of DAS appointees in government agencies, is a continuous variable whose value is expected to increase or not depending on the effects that political variables may exert on while taking the effects of control variables into account.

The independent variables assess features of the political parties in themselves and in their relationship with the Executive (which ultimately decides who is appointed to DAS

positions and how many DAS positions will be filled by individuals affiliated to political parties or not) that are expected to increase or decrease their chances of obtaining more DAS appointees in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy. “Ideology” measures party position estimates of each one of the 12 political parties in the “left-right” political spectrum. Parties closer to the left present values close to -1 and political parties on the right report values close to +1 (Zucco 2010). Parties situated more on the left are expected to obtain more DAS positions once the president’s party in both periods (2010 and 2011) are from the Workers’ Party, situated on the left. Political parties are unequal in strength and capacity to influence decisions in the legislative process in favor of the government. The number of seats a party has in the Chamber of Deputies is therefore pivotal to a political party’s ability to achieve positions of power inside the Chamber (e.g. leadership positions in the Chamber’s Directorate Board, Committees’ leadership positions, and the like) as well as inside the government’s bureaucracy. Thus the president is expected to favor parties with more deputies in the allocation of ministries and DAS positions as well. Another factor to be considered is whether or not a party indicates the minister to which an agency is subordinated. Parties that appoint ministers to a ministry are expected to achieve more DAS positions in these ministries than other parties in the same ministries.

One of the most important factors that account for a party’s capacity to fill positions in the bureaucratic structure of the government is to be the same party that of the president’s (formateur’s advantage). In Brazil’s case the Workers’ Party would be in a much better position to obtain DAS positions once the incumbent president belongs to the party. Because the president needs to give support to members of his/her party and wants to exert more control over the bureaucracy’s actions the president will probably indicate more members from his/her party in order to fulfill such needs. Hence we can assume that the president’s party will obtain more DAS positions relative to other political parties.

Finally, another important factor usually considered in the literature that studies portfolio allocation to political parties (such as Browne and Franklin 1973; Laver and Schofield 1990; Amorim Neto 1994; Martinez-Gallardo 2010, and many others) is the support each party provides to the Executive in Congress. We believe that support in Congress is also an important factor considered by the Executive at deciding how many DAS positions should be distributed to each political party. Therefore the more support in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies a party gives to the Executive on congressional roll calls, the more DAS positions a party will get.

The control variables related to the agencies' characteristics are considered to facilitate or to impose constraints on the Executive's capacity to fill DAS positions according to its preferences. The number of DAS slots available and their "insularity" from the political bargain, as well as the complexity and main activity areas in which each agency execute its functions, are expected to impose restrictions in the Executive's ability to appoint individuals affiliated to political parties to DAS positions. Some agencies (e.g. IPEA, Ministry of Finance) require more technical expertise and educational qualification from their servants, which may restrict the Executive's ability to fill DAS positions in these agencies with the purpose of patronage. On the other hand some agencies allow the Executive to fill DAS positions with affiliated party members more easily for they are not so consequential to a government's overall success (e.g. Fundacao Cultural Palmares) or because they have more DAS slots to be filled overall (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture). Consequently the inclusion of these control variables makes the statistical model more realistic by accounting for the political realities that Executive chiefs face when deciding how many and to whom appointments should be given (Moe 1985).

The table reports three models. The first one includes only the control variables<sup>11</sup>, namely those related to the characteristics of each governmental agency. The second model reports the independent variables of interest and the 3rd model reports the complete model.

**[Table 2 about here]**

With respect to the model's goodness-of-fit we can be confident about the overall significance of the regression models. We can reject with confidence the null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients are equal to zero, especially for Model2 and the Full Model. The independent variables of interest explain approximately 30% of the overall variance on the allocation of DAS appointees' positions to affiliated members of political parties. The increase in explained variance from Model 1 to Model 2 is dramatic and shows a prominence of political factors in the Executive's decision to allocate DAS positions among political parties<sup>12</sup>.

Results regarding the effects of the independent variables in Model 2 show that three of the five variables achieve high levels of statistical significance ( $p < 0.001$ ) and 4 of the five variables present coefficients pointed to the hypothesized directions (with the exception of party's support for the Executive in the lower Chamber). The number of deputy seats a political party have in the lower Chamber is strongly associated with a higher probability of obtaining more DAS appointees in the Brazilian bureaucracy. According to the model an unit increase in seat share leads to an increase in DAS party-affiliate appointments of .55. Furthermore, belonging to the same party as the president's brings noticeable advantages in

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<sup>11</sup> For more details see Table 3.

<sup>12</sup> The fact that control variables explain a little portion of the variance on the dependent variable is not tantamount to saying that the agencies' characteristics do not matter to DAS allocation decision overall. It is worth noting that even though DAS appointees affiliated to political parties constitute a big number in absolute terms they are a minority in relative terms. DAS appointees not affiliated to political parties compose 83% of all DAS appointees (according to our panel data for April 2010 and April 2011).

the appointment of party fellows to DAS positions. An unit increase in belonging to the president's party increases the probabilities of appointing its members to DAS positions by .11.

The presence of a minister affiliated to a political party increases the same party chances of appointing DAS appointees in their minister's subordinate agencies by .06. Other two variables did not achieve statistically significant effects on DAS appointments by parties, but their results are worth showing. Even though the coefficient for a party's ideological position is statistically insignificant its coefficient sign points to the expected direction, suggesting that political parties whose party points estimates are closer to the left may have an edge at appointing their members to DAS slots.

Finally, partisan support in the lower Chamber does not seem to be associated with DAS appointments and the variable's coefficient points in the opposite hypothesized direction. Nonetheless such result is not necessarily a proof that support for the government in Congress is unimportant. A temporal factor may play a role. In other words, parties that support the government more often can show support for the Executive first and obtain DAS posts later. Table 3 shows how the results of the model fit both the coalition/exchange goods perspective and the "insulated bureaucracy" theory.

Factors related to an agency's individual characteristics present some interesting results. Parties would be able to appoint partisans to DAS positions in agencies with civil career services clearly defined. Governmental bureaus at ministerial levels would be more willing to have DAS employees appointed by political parties. Such finding is not necessarily unexpected for several agencies not so directly subordinated to a ministry present more technocratic features and not infrequently lower budgets than ministerial-level bureaus. Also noticeable is that higher levels of institutionalization of ministerial units were not associated with lower levels.



The coefficients for DAS levels present both statistically significant but unexpected results. Parties were supposed to be less able to insert their members in agencies with higher numbers of DAS levels 4-6 positions than in agencies with higher numbers of DAS levels 1-3 positions. We are unable at this moment to account for these findings and believe a more accurate assessment of the results for both variables is necessary in order for us to better explain such findings. Nevertheless we believe that the control variables' findings suggest that bureaucratic insulation has not prevented parties from appointing DAS appointees or has not played a role at preventing such appointments.

Even though the study presents results that are theoretically consistent with our hypotheses and advances our understanding of the relationship between the use of the bureaucracy by the Executive in its relationship with political parties some shortcomings may probably be present and deserve careful consideration.

With reference to the data used in this study it should be noted that the time period under consideration is very short and encompasses only two periods, April of 2010 and April of 2011. Such a restricted time period limits considerably our capacity to assess the impact of explanatory variables like partisan support in the lower Chamber to the Executive. The relationship between the Executive and political parties in Congress needs time to establish and generate results and requires a considerable amount of negotiation, especially in the fragmented Brazilian multiparty system of parties with low levels of internal cohesion. A more extensive time period is thus necessary to allow us a better assessment about the impact of party support in Congress in their probabilities of seeing more of their party affiliates appointed to positions inside the Brazilian bureaucracy.

More technical factors may also be limiting our ability to better estimate more reliable results. For instance some outlier observations may be plaguing the analysis. This is a serious issue for outliers can bias regression slopes, which requires a more thorough look at them in

future studies and replication of our data. Besides we were unable to rule out the possibility that some omitted variables may be impacting the analysis. One notable variable that was out of this study is the budget<sup>13</sup>, which has always been a very important element to be considered in the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative in Brazil (Alston and Mueller 2005; Figueiredo and Limongi 2008; Bittencourt 2008). Once this type of data is available for use, our understanding of the allocation dynamics of DAS positions will be substantially improved. Lastly some independent variables may not be exhibiting the most germane functional forms. However, we are confident that such problems can be adequately solved.

Studies on politics and the bureaucracy in presidential systems through a political science perspective are still in their infancy. For instance we still know very little about the extent of politicization in the Brazilian bureaucracy and its consequences for bureaucratic performance, as well as about bureaucratic turnover and government's control of the bureaucracy. All these topics exert a direct effect on the policy-making process in Brazil and need to be addressed by future studies.

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<sup>13</sup> Problems in the dataset regarding two budget variables will be addressed in the next version of the paper.

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## Appendix

**Table 1. Summary Statistics**

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Prop. of affiliated DAS per party and ministerial agencies	1824	.073	.113	0	1	Portal da Transparência do Governo Federal + TSE
Total of pol. appointees	1824	273.93	353.45	0	2395	Portal da Transparência do Governo Federal + TSE
DAS level 1-3	1824	1.31	7.017	0	87.5	Portal da Transparência do Governo Federal + TSE
DAS level 4-6	1824	.242	.161	0	1	Portal da Transparência do Governo Federal + TSE
President (Dilma=1, LulaII=0)	1824	.5	.500	0	1	
Government activity	1824	.236	.425	0	1	SIORG
Economic Activity	1824	.223	.416	0	1	SIORG
Social activity	1824	.289	.453	0	1	SIORG
Party seat share in the House	1824	.076	.047	0.0156	0.1741	Cebrap legislative data
Ministerial unit has a civil service career	1824	.565	.495	0	1	Tabela de Remuneracao dos Servidores Publicos Federais
Federal agency	1824	.552	.497	0	1	Sinteses Tematicas do Ministerio do Planejamento
Institutionalization of the	1488	.713	.234	0.0833	0.9894	Sinteses

ministerial units						Tematicas do Ministerio do Planejamento Zucco 2010 (IQSS Dataverse)
Ideology (party points estimates)	1672	-.069	.528	-0.98	0.69	
Minister indicated by the party	1824	.070	.255	0	1	
Minister not affiliated to a pol. Party	1824	.184	.387	0	1	Cebrap
President's party	1824	.083	.276	0	1	Cebrap
Partisan support to government bills	1824	.649	.262	0.027	0.881	Cebrap legislative data

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Note: TSE (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral), Cebrap (Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planejamento), SIORG (Sistema de Informações Organizacionais do Governo Federal).



**Table 2. Determinants of the allocation of DAS positions among political parties (Random Effects)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Full Model
DAS Total	-0.00000341 (-0.44)		-0.00000412 (-0.54)
DAS Level 1-3	-0.000892** (-2.77)		-0.000882** (-2.76)
DAS Level 4-6	-0.0262+ (-1.67)		-0.0262+ (-1.67)
Government activity	-0.0105 (-1.55)		-0.0107 (-1.60)
Economic activity	0.00127 (0.18)		0.00153 (0.22)
Social activity	0.000203 (0.03)		0.00142 (0.23)
Federal agency	-0.00985+ (-1.73)		-0.00939+ (-1.67)
Ministerial unit has a civil service career	0.00971+ (1.87)		0.00988+ (1.93)
Institutionalization of the ministerial units	0.00307 (0.27)		0.00338 (0.30)
President	-0.00202 (-0.46)		-0.00202 (-0.46)
Ideology		-0.00560 (-0.40)	-0.00555 (-0.40)
Party seat share in the House		0.551*** (3.66)	0.551*** (3.66)
Minister indicated by the party		0.0699*** (6.81)	0.0700*** (6.83)
President's party		0.110*** (3.79)	0.110*** (3.79)
Partisan support to government bills		-0.00303 (-0.16)	-0.00288 (-0.15)
Constant	0.0818*** (3.78)	0.0199 (1.24)	0.0274 (1.43)
Overall R-squared	0.0081	0.3010	0.3091
Wald chi2	21.41	155.61	177.91
Prob > chi2	0.0110	0.0000	0.0000
N observations	1824	1824	1824
N groups	12	12	12

Notes: Cells report random effects regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Model 1 includes control variables.

+ p<.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 3. Hypotheses regarding the effects of variables on DAS positions allocated to pol. parties**

Variable	Sign of coefficient	Statistically significant + Expected Direction	Statistically Significant + Different Direction than Expected	Not statistically significant
IV: Party seat share in the House	$\beta > 0$	<i>Appointments as “coalition goods”</i>	Appointments as “exchange goods”	Appointments as “exchange goods”
IV: Partisan support to government bills on the floor	$\beta > 0$	Appointments as “coalition goods”	Appointments as “exchange goods”	<i>Appointments as “coalition goods”</i>
IV: Ideology	$\beta < 0$	Appointments as “coalition goods”	Appointments as “exchange goods”	<i>Appointments as “coalition goods”</i>
IV: President’s party	$\beta > 0$	<i>Appointments as “coalition goods”</i>	Appointments as “exchange goods”	Appointments as “exchange goods”
IV: Minister indicated by the party	$\beta > 0$	<i>Appointments as “coalition goods”</i>	Appointments as “exchange goods”	Appointments as “exchange goods”
CV: Jurisdictional area of the ministerial unit	$\beta > 0$	Insulated Bureaucracy theory	Contrary to IB theory	<i>Contrary to IB theory</i>
CV: Institutionalization of the ministerial units	$\beta < 0$	IB theory	Contrary to IB theory	<i>Contrary to IB theory</i>
CV: Ministerial unit has a civil service career	$\beta < 0$	IB theory	<i>Contrary to IB theory</i>	Contrary to IB theory

Note: IV: independent variable; CV: control variable; Italics: results of the model.