Political Institutions

The institutional evolution of the representative government in liberal Italy (1861-1922) and Republican Brazil (1891-1930)

O objetivo principal deste projeto é comparar o funcionamento das instituições representativas no Brasil republicano (1891-1930) e na Itália liberal (1861-1922). Trata-se de duas experiências amplamente tratadas na literatura histórica e jurídica, mas completamente negligenciadas pelos politologos de ambos os países. Em razão disso, o projeto nasce com a pretensão de levar a discussão metodológica dominante na ciência política atual para estes dois casos. Para isso, decidiu-se focar o estudo dos parlamentos de Brasil e Itália no âmbito de três aspectos:

1) a percepção da sociedade da época sobre as instituições representativas;

2) os outputs legislativos

3) a organização dos trabalhos internos.

Este enfoque visa mostrar, ao lado da visão dominante sobre os parlamentos da época, como efetivamente se realizava o padrão de relacionamento entre executivo e legislativo e seu desempenho institucional.
 

 

Researchers involved

 

Publications of Jaqueline Porto Zulini

RICCI, PaoloZULINI, Jaqueline. "Beheading", Rule Manipulation and Fraud: The Approval of Election Results in Brazil, 1894–1930. Journal of Latin American Studies, 44, pp. 495-521.

RICCI, Paolo; ZULINI, Jaqueline Quem ganhou as eleições? A validação dos resultados eleitorais antes da criação da justiça eleitoral. Revista de Sociologia e Política.  doi: 10.1590/S0104-44782009000200001

 

Party behavior in the 1946 Republic: a study on the patterns of support and conflict between Congress and Government

Jaqueline Porto Zulini masters research Project. Fundamentally, it is an investigation on how the presidents of the 1946 republic built majorities in the Chamber of Deputies to approve their agenda. The literature on this subject points to a predominance of ad hoc coalitions which would be explained by low levels of party coordination and the prevalence of factions within parties.

 

 

The institutional evolution of the representative government in liberal Italy (1861-1922) and Republican Brazil (1891-1930)

According to the literature, the main feature of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches in the Brazilian First Republic is equilibrium. In contrast to the first Republican decade, with the disruption of the existing institutional apparatus which would have led to a chaotic environment, it is believed that the years that followed the government of President Campos Sales were marked by political and institutional normalization and the beginning of what would become the longest lasting formula in national history, articulated in the Governors’ Pact. The hypothesis of this research is that the apparent stability of the regime does not correspond to a harmony of interests between these power spheres. In other words, a conflict between them did exist and this research seeks precisely to shed light on these facts by studying bills vetoed during the Constitutional Reform of 1926 and the subsequent period.

From Fernanda Machado and Giancarlo Casellato Gozzi.